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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In The Matter of ROBERT BLU1\1ENBERG,
Petitioner,
-againstNEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PARO LE,
Respondent,
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI # 01-14-ST6232 Index No. 5418 -14
Appearances:

Robert Blumenberg

Inmate No. 13-A-0702
Petitioner, Pro Se

Gowanda Correctional Facility
South Road
P.O. Box 311
Gowanda, NY 14070-0311
Eric T. Schneiderman
Attorney General
State of New York
Attorney For Respondent
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
(Melissa A. Latino,
Assistant Attorney General
of Counsel)

DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT

George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice
The petitioner, an inmate currently housed at Gowanda Correctional Facility,
commenced the instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent
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dated January 7, 2014 to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. He is serving an
indeterminate term of 1 l /3 to 3 years- following a conviction for driving while intoxicated.
Among the arguments advanced in the petitioner, the petitioner maintains that the Parole
Board based its determination solely upon the seriousness of the instant offense and his
·criminal history, without consideration of other relevant factors. In support of his contention
that the Parole Board failed to comply with Executive Law § 259-c (4), the petitioner makes
reference to his COMPAS Re-entry Risk Assessment , which found him to be at low risk in
the areas of felony violence, arrest and absconding. He maintains that his due proc'ess rights
were violated, in part, by reason that the parole determination lacks a detailed analysis of the
facts, and that it was "blatantly apparent" that the Parole Board ignored his institutional
accomplishments, goals and release plans. He criticizes the Parole Board for considering
crimes he committed twenty years ago. In his words, the Board "employed past-focused
rhetoric not future-focused risk assessment analysis". The petitioner asserts that the Parole
Board failed to evaluate the likelihood that he presents a current danger to society (which he
claims he does not).

For all of the foregoing reasons, the petitioner asserts that the

determination is arbitrary and capricious.
The reasons for the respondent's determination to deny petitioner release on parole
are set forth as follows:
"Denied, Hold for 24 months to 11-15 .
"Parole is denied. After a review of the record and interview,
the panel has determined that if released at this time there is a
reasonable probability that you would not live and remain at
liberty without again violating the law and your release would
be incompatible with the welfare of society.
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"This decision is based upon the following factors:

Your
instant offenses are driving while intoxicated wherein you
operated a motor vehicle with a BAC of .19 percent. You
further had your child in your vehicle and rear ended a vehicle

at a traffic light. Your behavior presents a risk to the traveling
public. This is your third state prison term. Your record dates
back to 1976 and spans two states, includes felonies,
misdemeanors, prior prison and/or jail and a failure at prior
community supervision. You clearly failed to benefit from prior
efforts at rehabilitation. Note is made by this board of your
EEC, Merit, Sentencing Minutes, Compas Risk Assessment,
rehabilitative efforts, risk, needs, parole plan, letters of support,
disciplinary record and all other required factors. Merit release
is hereby denied(]''.
Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory
requirements, notreviewable (MatterofDelrosariovEvans, 12 1AD3d1152, 1152-1153 [3d
Dept., 2014]; Matter of Williams v New York State Division of Parole, 114 AD3d 992 [3d

Dept., 2014; Matter of
. Campbell v Evans, 106 AD3d 1363, 1363-1364 [3d Dept., 2013]).
.

Furthennore, only a "showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety" on the part of the

Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon v
Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole,

50 NY2d 69, 77 [1980]; see also Matter of Graziano v Evans, 90 AD3d 1367, 1369 [3d
Dept., 2011 ]). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the
discretionary determination made by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v. New York
State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 2002]).
A review of the transcript of the parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant
offense, attention was paid to such factors as his acquisition of a merit certificate and earned
eligibility certificate. Inquiry was made by Commissioner Smith concerning petitioner's
plans upon his release. The petitioner mentioned entering an outpatient treatment program
3
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and attending AA meetings. By way of employment, the petitioner indicated that he would
work as a carpenter framing houses and doing remodeling. Commissioner Smith reviewed
findings from petitioner's Compas Risk Assessment instrument, noting that while the
petitioner was at low risk for violence, his rating for reentry substance abuse was "highly
probable". It was noted that the petitioner had only one Tier 2 disciplinary "ticket". It was
also noted that there were letters of support for petitioner's release in the record. He was
afforded ample opportunity to speak on his own behalf.
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its
decision and its determination was supported by the record. The decision was sufficiently
detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the denial of parole and it satisfied the
requirements of Executive Law §259-i (see Matter ofSiao-Pao, 11NY3d773 (2008]; Matter
of Whitehead v. Russi, 201AD2d825 [3rd Dept., 1994]; Matter of Green v. New York State
Division of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 1993 ]). It is proper and, in fact, required, that
the Parole Board consider the seriousness of the inmate's crimes and their violent nature (see
Matter of Williams v New York State Division of Parole, supra; Matter of Matos v New
York State Board of Parole, 87 AD3d 1193 [3d Dept., 2011]; Matter ofDudleyvTravis, 227
AD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 1996), as well as the inmate's criminal history (see Matter of Farid v
Travis, 239 AD2d 629 [3rd Dept., 1997]; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd
Dept., 1998]). The Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each
factor that it considered in determining the inmate's application, or to expressly discuss each
one (see Matter of Davis v Evans, 105 AD3d 1305 [3d Dept., 2013); Matter of MacKenzie
v Evans, 95 AD3d 1613 [3d Dept., 2012]; Matter of Matos v New York State Board of
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Parole, supra; MatterofYoungvNewYorkDivisionofParole, 74AD3d 1681, 1681-1682
[3rd Dept., 2010]). Nor must the parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth
in the first sentence of Executive Law § 259-i (2) (c) (A) (see Matter of Silvera v Dennison,
28 AD3d 859 [3rd Dept., 2006]). In other words, "[w]here appropriate the Board may give
considerable weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for
which a petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner's criminal history, together with the
other statutory factors, in determining whether the individ.ual 'will live and remain at liberty
without violating. the law,, whether his or her 'release is not incompatible with the welfare
of society,' and whether release will 'deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to
undermine respect for [the] law"' (Matter of Durio v New York State Division of Parole, 3
AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 2004], quoting Executive Law §259-i [2] [c] [A], other citations
omitted).
It is well settled that receipt of a certificate of earned eligibility does not serve as a
guarantee ofrelease (Matter of Dorman v New York State Board of Parole, 30 AD3d 880 [3rd
Dept., 2006]; Matter of Pearl v New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1058 (3rd
Dept., 2006]).
With regard to petitioner's arguments concerning an alleged violation of his right to
due process, the Court first observes that there is no inherent right to parole under the
constitution of either the United States or the State of New York (see Greenholtz v Inmates
of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 US 1, 7 [1979]; Matter of Russo v
New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 73, supra). It has been repeatedly held that
Executive Law § 259-i does not create in any prisoner an entitlement to, or a legitimate
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expectation of, release; therefore, no constitutionally protected liberty interests are implicated

by the Parole Board's exercise of its discretion to deny parole (see Barna v Travis, 239 F3d
169, 171 (2d Cir., 2001]; Marvin v Goord, 255 F3d 40; 44 (2d Cir., 2001]; Boothe v
Hammock, 605 F2d 661, 664 [2d Cir., 1979]; Paunettov Hammock, 516 F Supp 1367, 1367-

1368 [SD NY, 1981]; Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 75-76,
supra. Matter of Gamez v Dennison, 18 AD3d 1099 [3rd Dept., 2005]; Matter of Lozada v
New York State Div. of Parole, 36 AD3d 1046, 1046 [3rd Dept., 2007]) .. As noted, the
decision of the Parole Board provided adequate reasons, supported in the record, why he
should not be released. The Court, accordingly, finds no due process violation.
The Parole Board properly engaged in a risk and needs assessment as required under
Executive Law§ 259-c (4), including review of the COMPAS instrument (see Matter of
DelrosariovEvans, 121AD3d1152, supra; Matter ofParteev Evans, 117AD3d1258, 1259
[3d Dept., 2014], Iv denied 24 NY3d 901 [2014]). "The CO.rvfPAS instrument, however, is
only one factor that the Board was required to consider in evaluating petitioner's request"
(Matter of Matter of Rivera v New York State Div. of Parole, 119 AD3d 1107, 1109 [3d
Dept., 2014]).
Lastly, the Parole Board's decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24
months) is within the Board's discretion and was supported by the record (see Matter of
Campbell v Evans, 106 AD3d 1363, supra, at 1364, citing Matter of Tatta v State of New
York Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 2002], Iv denied 98 NY2d 604 [2002]).
The Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and contentions and finds
them to be without merit.
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The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The
petition m st therefore be dismissed.
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the
petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order,
is sealing all records submitted for in camera review.
Accordingly, it is

ORll ERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed.
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original
decision/order/judgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents: All other papers are
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing.

The signing of this

decision/order/j udgment and delivery of this decision/order/judgment does not constitute
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220.

Counsel is not relieved from the applicable

Papers Considered:
I.

2.
3.

Order To Show Cause dated October 30, 2014, Petition, Supporting Papers
and Exhibits
Respondent's Answer dated January 9, 2015, Supporting Papers and
Exhibits
Affirmation of Terrence X. Tracy, Esq., dated December 31, 2014,
Supporting Papers and Exhibits
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STATEOF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In The Matter of Robert Blumenberg,
Petitioner,
-against-

.
NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE,
Respondent,

For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI # 01-14-ST6232 Index No. 5418 -14
SEALING ORDER
The following.docUJ.1?.ents having been filed by the respondent with the Court for in

camera review in connection with

the

.

.

above matter, namely, respondent's Exhibit B,

Presentence Investigation Report, and respondent's ExhibitD, Confidential Portion ofInmate
Status Report, Exhibit E, COMPAS Re-Entry Risk Assessment, and Exhibit F , COMPAS
Reentry Risk Assessment, it is hereby
ORDERED, that the foregoing designated documents, including all duplicates and
copies thereof, shall be filed as sealed instruments and not made available to any person or
public or.private agency unless by further order of the Court.

ENTJ&:R
Dated:

February ::> , 2015
Troy, New York

George B. Ceresia, Jr.
Supreme Court Justice

